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 1 Introduction
The belief that peers’ characteristics in school inﬂuence the behavior and outcomes
of students has been important in shaping public policy. But, what are we exactly
referring to when talking about “peer eﬀects”? Arnott and Rowse (1987) used this
term to refer to the eﬀect on an individual’s academic performance of the ability
distribution of their peers. In general there has been limited attention given to the
mechanisms through which peers eﬀects work. The most common perspective is that
peers, like families, are sources of motivation, aspirations, and direct interactions in
learning. Moreover, peers may aﬀect the classroom process (aiding learning through
questions and answers, contributing to the pace of instruction, or hindering learning
through disruptive behavior à la Lazear (2001)).
Interest in social interactions, neighborhood eﬀects, and social dynamics has seen
recently a revival. A small literature has emerged that studies the generation of
persistent inequality among a population due to neighborhood eﬀects of various kinds.
All these eﬀects have the consequence of inducing sub-optimal levels of education for
some groups of the population. These neighborhood eﬀects consist mainly of three
types: investment, role-model and peer-group inﬂuences. Investment refers to local
public good provision. It occurs when the poor are segregated in a community: due
to the low tax base, funding of local education is low, and hence children receive less
education than in richer communities. Under the role-model eﬀect, the behavior of
one individual in a group is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of and earlier behavior
of older members of the group. Peer group inﬂuences refer to contemporaneous
inﬂuences and so may be reciprocal.1
Peer group eﬀects have played an important role in a number of policy debates
including: ability tracking, anti-poverty programs in both rural areas and urban ghet-
tos, and school desegregation. The peer group composition of schools is, therefore,
undeniably important in the minds of parents as well as policy makers at the local
and state level. If peer eﬀects exist, the government should, therefore, be able to take
them into account in order to better achieve policy objectives. An example of this is
the choice between streaming (or tracking) and mixing students of diﬀerent abilities
1See Roemer and Wets (1994), Maski (1993) and Durlauf (2002). Roemer and Wets (1994) and
Streufert (2000) show how economic segregation can lead to inaccurate assessments of the economic
payoﬀ to education. The basic idea in this type of analysis is that by depriving children in poor
neighborhoods of successful role models (which is a necessary consequence of economic segregation),
they make inferences on the beneﬁts to education that are biased downward.
3in public schools.
There is a great deal of controversy regarding the practice of ability grouping or
tracking (to group students in classrooms according to their ability level). The main
argument is that by narrowing the range of students’ abilities within the classroom,
teachers can target instruction to a level more closely aligned with students’ needs
than in more heterogeneous environments. The critics of ability grouping argue that
when students are segregated, disadvantaged students lose any positive peer eﬀects
that might be gained from being with more able students. In keeping with this view,
there has been considerable movement in the US towards eliminating the practice
of grouping students according to ability.2 In Europe there is currently an intense
debate in response to the publication of the PISA 2000 and 2003 Reports and the
quite diﬀerent results achieved by countries with diﬀerent education systems. In
fact, simple cross-country comparisons show that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
correlation between the level of stratiﬁcation in the education system and country
mean performance. However, the more diﬀerentiated and selective education systems
tend to show larger performance diﬀerences between students from more and less
advantaged family backgrounds.3
The inﬂuence of peers ability on own educational achievement is well documented
but still controversial. Most of works focus on the average innate ability within the
class as the main characteristic of the student’s classmates which can aﬀect achieve-
ment. On the one hand, for example, Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992), and more
recently Arcidiciano and Nicholson (2002) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant peer group eﬀect that van-
ishes when they control for endogeneity. On the other hand, Henderson, Mieszkowski,
and Sauvageau (1978), Summers and Wolfe (1977) and more recently Zimmer and
Toma (2000) report signiﬁcant positive inﬂuences of higher achieving peers on achieve-
ment.
The existence of peer eﬀects and its relation with diﬀerent policies of grouping
students have been studied theoretically as well as empirically. The very ﬁrst empir-
2For example, data from the Schools and Staﬃng Survey suggest than 20% of school with pro-
grams for gifted children in 1990 had eliminated the programs by 1993 (Figlio and Page (2000)).
3The Programme for International Student Assess m e n t( P I S A )t e s t e d1 5y e a r - o l ds t u d e n t si nt h e
subjects mathematics, science and reading proﬁciency in the ﬁrst half of 2000 and 2003, in all OECD
countries. For example, while Finland and The Netherlands achieved the top ranks, Germany and
Spain were placed below or just above the OECD average in both reports. These countries are suited
for a comparison of a streamed or tracked system (Germany and The Netherlands) to a single type
schooling system (Finland and Spain). See PISA 2003 Report.
4ical works on peer eﬀects focused on ethnic and racial groups. Following this line,
Schoﬁeld (1995) made a review on the impact of desegregation (or detracking) on
students academic achievement. More recently, and focusing on the eﬀects of group-
ing students by ability the majority of works conclude that relative to outcomes in
mixed groups, students placed in the low track are hurt while those allocated in the
high track gain. This result is consistent with our model. Therefore, the remaining
question is whether the losses of the former compensate or not the gains of the latter.
Argys et al.(1996) conclude by saying that on net terms, if all students in their sample
were placed in heterogeneous classes (mixing), average test scores could be expected
to decline. However, Betts and Shkolnik (2000) ﬁnd little or no diﬀerential eﬀects
of grouping students. Finally, Figlio and Page (2000) ﬁnd no evidence that tracking
hurts low ability children. Theoretical contributions are more scarce. Among others
we ﬁnd the works by de Bartolome (1990) and Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002).
Arnott and Rowse (1987) studied the optimal allocation of students and educational
expenditures over classrooms when peer group eﬀects are present. They concluded
that the optimal allocation, when the objective is to maximize the sum of students
results, depends on the properties of the educational production function.
The aim of this paper is to study public intervention in education when the gov-
ernment, taking into account the process of human capital accumulation and, in par-
ticular, the peer eﬀects on students’ achievement, has to decide the optimal education
system. I analyze two diﬀerent education systems. The ﬁrst one, tracking, consists
on grouping students based on innate ability. The second one, mixing, implies that
the ability distribution is the same in all classrooms. Both education systems must
be understood as polar cases.
Our model is an economy in which individuals live for two periods. Individuals
diﬀer in two aspects: innate ability, and family background. In the ﬁrst period
individuals attend compulsory education where they accumulate human capital. The
acquisition of human capital reﬂects the inﬂuence of family and peers factors. As I
said above, I consider two diﬀerent educational systems at compulsory level: mixing
and tracking. At some point of the ﬁrst period, students must also decide whether
to attend college or not. If they do, they spend the second part of this ﬁrst period
a tc o l l e g e . I ft h e yd on o t ,t h e ye n t e ri m m e d i a t e l yi nt h el a b o u rm a r k e tw o r k i n ga s
unskilled workers. By attending college they become skilled workers. During the
second period all individuals work. Those who went to college as skilled workers and
those who did not go as unskilled.
5My goal is to evaluate these two systems, using several criteria that have not been
used previously in this literature. Note that I propose a normative theory, so I need to
deﬁne the objectives of the government. Although there are several views about what
these objectives should be, till now most of the debates focus on which system leads
to higher achievement. I will consider this objective but also some others, that can be
classiﬁed according to the education level analyzed, compulsory or post-compulsory
(college).
This paper contributes to the literature in two directions. First, at compulsory
level the paper advances the existing literature on evaluating the consequences on the
distribution of human capital under both educational systems, by using the “Veil of
Ignorance” assumption, widely used in modern Welfare Economics. Under reason-
able assumptions about the human capital production function, I ﬁnd that average
human capital at compulsory level is always maximized under tracking. However,
tracking does not dominate mixing according to the criteria of ﬁrst and second or-
der stochastic dominance. This is equivalent to say that, given the choice between
both educational systems to any individual in the population, in complete ignorance
of what his/her relative position would be within each system, there would be no
unanimously preferred system.
The second contribution of my paper lies on highlighting the importance of ana-
lyzing the possible eﬀects of the education system at compulsory level on individuals’
outcomes later in life, such as college choice and occupational attainment. Yet, school-
ing decisions may depend in important ways on the amount of schooling acquired by
other individuals. The idea is that an individual’s self image may be enhanced when
his or her actions are in line with the behavior in the peer group.4
The ﬁrst aim when analyzing college level is to maximize college attendance. It
is found that the system that provides the maximum number of college students
depends on the opportunity cost of college attendance and on how wealthy society is.
In particular if the opportunity cost is low enough, mixing always maximizes college
attendance, and the reverse occurs when the opportunity cost is suﬃciently high,
for any wealth level in the population. For intermediate values of the opportunity
cost I ﬁnd that the education system that maximizes college attendance depends on
how rich society is. In particular, for poor societies the optimal education system is
4Other reasons for social interaction in schooling (although they are not the focus of this paper)
include social learning (Manski (2004)), and strategic consideration, i.e. that it pays oﬀ to acquire
more schooling if other students acquire more schooling due to labor market competition.
6tracking whereas for richer societies the optimal system is mixing.
The second criterion is equality of opportunities which in my model means to
guarantee that the individual decision of whether to attend college or not is taken
independently of parents’ income. I obtain that tracking is the most equitable system
in most of the cases except in situations where there is a high level of inequality in
the population, and when the minimum level of human capital required to attend
c o l l e g ei ss u ﬃciently low.
Finally the last criterion consists on maximizing the utility of the worst-oﬀ indi-
viduals in the society. I found that tracking (mixing) maximizes the probability of
college attendance of the worst-oﬀ individuals in the economy when the opportunity
cost of college attendance is high (low) enough.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I describe the model and the main
features of the human capital distribution under both education systems. In Section
3 I compare the performance of tracking and mixing system at compulsory level, by
analyzing the average human capital attained under each system and its eﬀects on
the distribution of human capital. Section 4 analyzes the individuals’ decision on
college attendance. Two criteria are proposed to compare both education systems
at this education level: maximum college attendance and equality of opportunities.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Individuals
I consider an economy in which individuals live for two periods. Population has
constant size equal to 1. Individuals in each generation diﬀer in two aspects: their
innate ability, θ0, and their family background denoted by z.5 To make the model
tractable I will assume that θ0 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and that
family background z takes only two values, 1 and x>1 with probabilities 1−λ and
λ, respectively. I assume that both characteristics are independently distributed.
In the ﬁrst period of their lives, individuals accumulate human capital. At the
beginning of this period they attend compulsory education, which is free of charge,
and they are not allowed to work. At some point of this ﬁrst period, they also have to
decide whether to attend college or not. I call γ,w h e r eγ ∈ [0,1], the fraction of the
5Therefore z could be either the parents’ level of income or the parents’ human capital.
7ﬁrst period that it is left after attending compulsory education. Those who attend
c o l l e g es p e n dt h ef r a c t i o nγ of the ﬁrst period at college, while the rest of individuals
work that fraction γ as unskilled workers. By attending college they become skilled
workers.6
During the second period of their lives all individuals have one unit of time and
work. Those who went to college as skilled workers and those who did not go as
unskilled. The wage they receive is proportional to their own level of human capital.
In this model mean income is λx +( 1− λ) and income inequality, measured by
the variance of income in the population, is (x − 1)2λ(1 − λ). Both are increasing
with x.B e l o w w e a n a l y z e t h e e ﬀect of mean income on the distribution of human
capital under both education systems.
2.2 Production of Human Capital
At this educational level, individuals are separated into diﬀerent groups. To simplify
matters, I will assume that there are only two groups or classrooms. The production
of human capital at compulsory level depends on three factors. The ﬁrst one is the
individual innate ability, θ0. The second one is the “formal schooling” or “peer group”
eﬀect. It will depend on the characteristics of the group in which the individual is
placed. These characteristics can be summed up by the mean ability of the group
j or “peer” eﬀect, denoted by θ0
j
. The third one is “informal schooling”and refers
to family background eﬀects, that are captured by z.7 After attending compulsory















6Note that the parameter γ can be interpreted as the cost of investment in human capital, or the
fraction of earnings that would have been received in the absence of the investment.
7Galor and Tsiddon (1997) call this factor home environment externality and distinguish it from
global technological externality, by which the aggregate level of human capital of the parents’ gen-
eration is transferred to the children. The last term has been used by several other studies among
others see Benabou (1996).
8The acquisition of human capital reﬂects the inﬂuence of family and peers factors,
with respective weights 1 − α and α,w h e r eα ∈ [0,1].8
The main properties of r are as follows. First, regarding family background, the
individuals’ level of human capital is an increasing function of the parental level of
human capital but at a decreasing rate, r2 > 0 and r22 < 0. In addition, note that
regarding the peer group eﬀect we have r1 > 0, r11 < 0 and r12 > 0.9
The empirical evidence establish that the peer group eﬀect is non-linear: the
achievement of individual students rises with an improvement in the average quality
of their classroom, but this positive eﬀect has decreasing returns.10
From Equations (1) and (2) we can observe that the peer eﬀect becomes more
eﬀective in the production of human capital as the level of innate ability or parents’











In the second part of the ﬁrst period, every individual decides whether to attend
college or not. After attending college they will enjoy a further increase in their
level of human capital acquired during compulsory level. I denote such an increment
by δ and, thus, those individuals who decide to attend college will end up with the
following level of human capital:
θ2 = θ1(1 + δ). (3)
The ﬁndings of the recent empirical literature show that factors that take place in
early stages of life are crucial determinants of children’s later success.12 Therefore we
8This technology of production of human capital is commonly used in this literature. See for
example Benabou (1996) or Epple and Romano (1998 and 2002).
9The importance of the parental education in the acquisition of human capital of the individual
has been explored theoretically as well as empirically. Among other see Coleman et al. (1966),
Becker and Tomes (1986). More recently, among others, Feinstein and Symons (1999) found that
parent interest is the principal via by which the attainments of each generation are passed to the
next. They also suggested the complementarity between parental interest and peer eﬀect.
10See Summers and Wolfe (1977), Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1978), de Bartolome
(1990), and more recently Zimmer and Toma (1997).
11The empirical evidence regarding these properties is still mixed. Henderson et al. (1978) ﬁnd no
interaction between own ability and the beneﬁts of an improved peer group, i.e. ∂2θ1
∂θ0
j∂θ0
=0 .A r g y s
et al. (1996) suggest ∂2θ1
∂θ0
j∂θ0
> 0. Summers and Wolfe (1977) ﬁnd some support for higher peer





12In particular, Neal and Johnson (1996) ﬁnd that diﬀerences in educational achievements by the
time of high-school completion account for almost all the observed black-white wage gap. See also
Keane and Wolpin (1997).
9assume that the acquisition of human capital at college is not directly aﬀected by the
family nor peers factors, although it is indirectly aﬀected by them since it depends
on the level of human capital previously acquired, δ = δ(θ1). We assume that this
increase, that reﬂects the eﬃcacy of higher education, is an increasing function of the
human capital acquired at compulsory level, but at a decreasing rate (δ1 > 0,δ11 < 0).
It is important to note that the characteristics of the group in which the individ-
ual is placed aﬀect her ﬁnal level of human capital θ2 through two diﬀerent channels.
First, there is a direct eﬀect since peers aﬀect the human capital acquired at com-
pulsory education. Second, there is also an indirect eﬀect since this level of human
capital determines the eﬃcacy of higher education and, thus, as we will see below,
the decision of the individual of whether to undertake college education or not.
It is important, therefore, to analyze the diﬀerent composition of the groups at
school, which are determined by the educational system prevailing. This composition
is going to be crucial in determining the distribution of human capital across the
population and, as we will see below, in the individuals’ decision of whether to attend
college or not. In the next section I will study the two diﬀerent educational systems.
2.3 Educational Systems at Compulsory Level
As I said in the Introduction, grouping students based on ability measures (tracking)
is very common in the USA and in Europe.13 In this paper I will consider two diﬀerent
educational systems at compulsory level: mixing and tracking. In this section I will
describe them and I will also analyze the distribution of human capital at the end of
compulsory school under both systems.
2.3.1 Mixing
Under mixing the ability distribution is the same in both classrooms. We denote
the average ability in each classroom by θ0
m
. It is the same in both classrooms and
coincides with the average ability in the population, m. That is, θ0
m
=1 /2.
However, as individuals diﬀer in their parents’ level of human capital, there will
be two income groups within each classroom: the rich and the poor. I will study now
the distribution of θ1, the human capital at the end of compulsory education. Note
13See Oakes et al. (1992) and PISA 2003 Report for US and Europe respectively. For the US
case, public schools teachers reported that only 14.4% and 10.8% of tenth-grade students were in
heterogeneous (untracked) math classes in 1988 and 1990 respectively, see Rees et al. (1996).
10that, with probability equal to λ, θ1 follows an uniform distribution on (0,b  ),a n d
with probability (1 − λ), θ1 follows a uniform distribution on (0,a  ), where b  and a 
denote the human capital θ1 acquired by the “best” individual (more skilled) in the
rich and the poor income group, respectively:
a
  =1 + ( 1 /2)
α (4)
b
  =1 + ( 1 /2)
αx
1−α. (5)
Under mixing, therefore, the C.D.F. (cumulative distribution function) of human
capital at the end of compulsory education, denoted by FM(θ1),i s :
FM(θ1)=

      
      






θ1 if 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ a 
(1 − λ)+
λ
b θ1 if a  ≤ θ1 ≤ b 
1 if θ1 >b  .
(6)
It can be easily checked that after any increase in mean income level, due either
to an increase in λ or x, the whole function FM(θ1) shifts down, which means that
after that change the resulting function dominates the initial one in the sense of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance.14
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Thus EM(θ1) is an average of the mean values of θ1 in the two income groups, with
respective weights (1−λ) and λ. F r o mt h ep r e v i o u se q u a t i o nw eo b s e r v et h a tEM(θ1)
is an increasing function of both x and λ: in a richer economy in which there are
either more individuals with high income level, or the same proportion of individuals
but with a higher level of income, there will be a higher aggregate level of human
capital than in a poor economy.15
14Recall that, given two distribution functions F(·) and G(·), F(·) ﬁrst order stochastically dom-
inates G(·), F(·)  FOSDG(·),i f( i ) F(z) ≤ G(z) for all z ∈ R and (ii) there exists   z such that
F(  z) <G (  z).
15Note that it can also be easily concluded from Equation (6) and the deﬁnition of expected value
of a random variable.
112.3.2 Tracking
Under this system students are grouped based on innate ability. For simplicity, I
permit at most two tracks. Thus, the median level of innate ability m, is used as a
threshold ability to group students. Students are assigned to the high (low) track as
long as their ability θ0 is above (below) the median.
The distribution of human capital within each track is uniform but with diﬀerent




the average ability in the high and low track














Again, there will be two income groups within each track. In the low track θ1
follows a uniform distribution on (0,c) with probability λ, and it follows a uniform
distribution on (0,a) with probability (1 − λ), where a and c denote the human

























I nt h es a m ew a y ,i nt h eh i g ht r a c kθ1 follows a uniform distribution on (b,e) with
probability λ, and it follows a uniform distribution on (d,f) with probability (1−λ).
We denote by b and d the human capital θ1 acquired by the “worst” individual (less
skilled) within the poor and the rich, respectively. We denote by e and f the human












































From previous Equations (9) to (14) we have that the two following conditions apply.
F i r s tw eh a v et h a ta<c , b<dand e<f . That is, independently of the ability
12group in which the individual is placed, given two individuals with the same level of
innate ability, the one whose parents have higher income level will always attain a
higher level of human capital. Second, we have that a>0,c>0,e>band f>d .
This means that, independently of the ability group in which the individual is placed,
given two individuals whose parents have the same income level, the one with a higher
level of innate ability will always attain a higher level of human capital.
Now I need to introduce some assumptions to ensure that the support of θ1 is
a connected set under tracking, i.e. the density function under tracking denoted by
fT(θ1) is strictly positive for all θ1 in the interval [0,f].
Assumption 1 (A.1): c>b .
This assumption ensures that the support of θ1 in the low track overlaps the
support of θ1 in the high track. In other words, the “best” (the richest and most
skilled) individual in the low track obtains more human capital than the “worst”
individual in the high track (the poorest and least skilled). This assumption implies
ar e s t r i c t i o no nb o t hx and α.F o r a ﬁxed α this implies that x h a st ob ea b o v ea
threshold level : x>x (α)=3
α
1−α. That is, x must be high enough to compensate
t h ed i s a d v a n t a g eo fb e i n gi nt h el o wt r a c k .
Assumption 2 (A.2): a  >d .
This assumption implies that the “best” individual among the poor obtains under
mixing a higher level of human capital than the “worst” individual among the rich
in the high track. As in previous Assumption 1, it implies a restriction on both x




In addition Assumption 2 implies that the two intervals within the high track
overlap, as in the low track case. That is, the “best” individual in the low income
group has more human capital than the “worst” individual in the high income group.
From Assumptions 1, 2 and Equations (4), (5), (12) and (14), I have that the
16One could think that the mixing system represents the public education system whereas tracking
represents a private system where only individuals with high levels of innate ability (and rich) are
accepted. Thus, A.2 implies that the best student in the public school can achieve a higher level of
human capital than the worst student in the private school.
13following two conditions hold:
e<b
  <f , (15)
d<a
  <e . (16)
These conditions refer to the relationship between the intervals of θ1 under tracking
and under mixing. In particular we have that, independently of the income group
where the individual is placed, an individual with the highest level of innate ability
will always achieve a higher level of human capital under tracking than under mixing,
that is, a  <eand b  <f .A l s o ,f o r a ﬁxed level of ability, a rich individual under
mixing will get more human capital than a poor individual under tracking, i.e., e<f.
From the previous two assumptions I have that for any α ∈ (0,1) t h ei n c o m el e v e l
of the rich must belong to the following interval :
x(α) <x<x(α). (17)
Inversely, one could think of a restriction on α for any x. In Figure 1 I illustrate the
diﬀerent intervals for θ1 and the relation among them, for both educational systems.
Now, under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, the C.D.F. of θ1 under tracking, denoted by
FT(θ1) is as follows:
FT(θ1)=

                             
                             







































θ1 if e ≤ θ1 ≤ f
1 if θ1 >f .
(18)
As in the case of mixing, an improvement in the mean income level implies that










Poor:  1 income =  

















Figure 1. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS When α =0we have that FT(θ1)=FM(θ1),s i n c et h ep e e re ﬀect plays no role on
human capital accumulation.































As in the case of mixing, the expected value of θ1 is a weighted average of
the mean value of θ1 in the four income groups previously analyzed. It is increasing
both in x and λ (see Footnote 15).
3 Comparing Educational Systems at the Compul-
sory Level
Most works dealing with the eﬀects of tracking focus just on comparing average
test scores in tracked groups relative to mixed groups. Here I adopt the “Veil of
Ignorance” approach widely used in modern Welfare Economics (see for example the
seminal works of Harsanyi (1953 and 1955) and Rawls (1971)). Under this approach,
to evaluate alternative systems individuals must put themselves behind a hypothetical
“veil of ignorance”, such they ignore their own characteristics. In our case this requires
to ignore the value of both θ0 and z. At this point it is crucial the assumptions made
regarding the information available to the individual when taking the decision. I will
apply diﬀerent concepts depending on that information.17
The task of individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” is to compare tracking and
mixing, assuming that individuals ignore θ0 and z. To start with, assume that they
also know that all of them vlaue positively θ1,t h a ti s ,a l lo ft h e mw o u l dl i k et oh a v e
as much of θ1 as possible.
This amounts to say that a particular system will be better if it induces an ag-
gregate distribution that dominates the other in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
17I will not discuss which are the most appropriate assumptions regarding what individuals should
know behind the veil of ignorance, since it is not the focus of the paper. See for example Roemer
(1996) for a detailed discussion on that matter.
16dominance. However, in my setting no system dominates the other. To see this, note
that from FT(θ1) in Equation (18) and FM(θ1) in Equation (6) we have that for any
θ1 ∈ (0,a], (FT(θ1) − FM(θ1)) > 0 for every λ,α and x. One can also check, using
Equations (18) and (6) that for any θ1 ∈ [d,f], (FT(θ1) − FM(θ1)) < 0.18
Next I assume that individuals are risk neutral. Thus, they will choose that system
that maximizes average human capital. 19
In the next proposition I show that average human capital is always maximized
u n d e rt r a c k i n g .W h i l et h er e s u l ti sa na l m o s ti m m e d i a t ec o n s e q u e n c eo ft h em o d e l ,
it is worth stating formally since it facilitates considerably the analysis of the rest of
the paper.
Proposition 1 Let α > 0. Then, ET(θ1) − EM(θ1) > 0 for all x and λ.
Proof. From Equations (7) and (20), and rearranging terms we have that the diﬀer-
ence between the average human capital under tracking and mixing, ET(θ1)−EM(θ1)





1−α +( 1− λ)














1−α +( 1− λ)










This expression represents the change in the mean ability when we move from mixing
to tracking. The ﬁrst term represents the losses for those individuals that go to the
low track, and the second term represents the gains of those individuals who join the
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> 0 for all α.B u tt h i s
expression is positive and strictly increasing when α > 0 and is equal to zero when
α =0 .T h i sp r o v e st h ec l a i m .
If the goal of government is to maximize average human capital across the pop-
ulation at the end of the compulsory level, it should choose the educational system
that groups students according to ability.
18Clearly this implies that very risk-averse individuals will always prefer mixing while very risk-
loving individuals always prefer tracking.
19Since it is implicitly assumed that individuals derive utility from lifetime income, which is
supposed to be a linear function of the level of human capital (see Section 4 below), the maximization
of the average human capital can be interpreted also as an utilitarian criteria.
17An implication of Proposition 1 is that FM(θ1) cuts FT(θ1) from below for all
λ,α and x.This means that individuals with low ability will prefer mixing whereas
individuals with high ability will prefer tracking. We illustrate this point for some
values of the parameters in Figure 2.
We conclude that although average human capital is higher under tracking, it is
not true that the distribution of human capital under tracking dominates the distri-
bution under mixing in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. In other words,
given the choice between both educational systems, some individuals will prefer track-
ing and some others will prefer mixing, meaning that when going from one system to
another there will always be winners and losers.20
Finally assume that all individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” are risk averse.
Therefore, individuals will prefer the less risky distribution of human capital. This
criteria leads to the concept of second order stochastic dominance.21
In the next Proposition I show that there is no system preferred to the other under
this criteria.
Proposition 2 Fr(θ1) SOSD Fs(θ1) for r,s = M,T and r  = s.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can conclude given the choice between tracking and mixing under the “veil of
ignorance”, i.e. before they know which will be their own innate ability level, there
will be no unanimity in the society on the choice of the educational system.
It is important to stress the fact that the previous result applies to the compulsory
level of education. When analyzing average human capital at college level it has to be
20Brunello and Giannini (2001) also conclude that neither a mixed nor a tracked system unambigu-
ously dominates the other in terms of eﬃciency. However, the concept of both mixed and tracked
groups diﬀers from ours, since they do not consider the existence of peer group eﬀects. In their
model, tracking implies that the individuals are allocated to vocational or academic schools based
on measures of their academic talent. Under mixing the students are not streamed and receive both
technical and general education.
21Recall that, given two distribution functions F(·) and G(·), F(·) second order stochastically
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1 () F θ  
1 θ  
1 () M F θ
1 () T F θ
1 
b′ f  taken into account that some individuals have dropped oﬀ the educational system af-
ter compulsory education and thus, average human capital is not that straightforward
to calculate.
4 Comparing Educational Systems at the College
Attendance Level
Now I turn to study how individuals decide whether to attend college or not. I am
interested in how the system chosen at compulsory level, tracking or mixing, could
aﬀect this decision. I assume that individuals want to maximize their consumption
that is equal to their lifetime income, which is supposed to be a linear function of the
level of human capital. First, if an individual does not go to college, she will work as
an unskilled worker a fraction γ of the ﬁrst period and the whole second period. Her
lifetime income will be θ1(1 + γ).
Second, the lifetime income of those individuals who decide to go to college is
the skilled wage, i.e. the increased level of human capital after attending college,
θ2 = θ1(1 + δ(θ1)).
Finally, individuals take as given the educational system, either tracking or mixing.
Then, for all individuals who decide to attend college, the following condition must
hold:
θ1(1 + δ(θ1)) ≥ θ1(1 + γ),
or,
δ(θ1) ≥ γ. (21)
This condition determines a minimum level of human capital accumulated through
compulsory education, θ
∗
1, such that only individuals above that threshold will attend
college.22 That is, θ
∗
1 ∈ (0,f) is the value that satisﬁe st h ep r e v i o u se q u a t i o nw i t h
equality.
It is crucial to see in which interval the threshold level θ
∗
1 is placed, since this
determines the composition of the students’ body under tracking. Thus, we can
distinguish the following three cases:
(i) If θ
∗
1 ∈ (0,b) some individuals from the low track attend college and all indi-
viduals from the high track attend college.
22To ensure that θ
∗
1 is interior we will assume that δ(θ1 =0 )< γ < δ(θ1 = f).
20(ii) If θ
∗
1 ∈ (b,c) some individuals from both tracks attend college. This case is
only possible because of Assumption 1.
(iii) If θ
∗
1 ∈ (c,f) only individuals from the high track attend college.
The interval where θ
∗
1 is placed depends on both the eﬃcacy of higher education
described by δ(θ1), and the opportunity cost of attending college measured by γ.
In particular, for a given function δ(θ1),a ni n c r e a s ei nγ will move θ
∗
1 to the right
and a lower proportion of individuals will attend college. In addition, for a ﬁxed γ
an upward shift of δ(θ1) implies that a higher proportion of individuals will attend
college.
Now I turn to compare both systems after individuals have decided on college
attendance. First, I will analyze which system maximizes college attendance. Next
I will propose a criteria of equality of opportunities that consists of minimizing the
i n c o m ep r e m i u m ,w h e r et h i si n c o m ep r e m i u mi sd e ﬁned as the diﬀerence in the prob-
ability of attending college between the rich and the poor under each system.
4.1 Proportion of college students
In Section 3 I concluded that tracking is the system that maximizes average human
capital at compulsory level. However, this result should not be overemphasized since
tracking may aﬀect decisions on college attendance.23
One could think of higher education as positive for the individual himself and her
well-being, but one could also think of the positive externalities generated by more
highly educated people for the entire society. On this respect, Moretti (2004) ﬁnd
empirical evidence suggesting that an increase in the supply of college graduates not
only increases less educated wages, but also high school wages. In addition recent
research has pointed to the signiﬁcance of human capital accumulation for economic
growth (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)) and as a result, there is much policy
focus on promoting human capital formation (see, for example, PISA 2003 Report).
An important aspect in this regard is the extent to which the demand for higher
education is aﬀected by the education system prevailing at compulsory level through
the existence of peer eﬀects. Then, we want to analyze which system, tracking or
mixing, provides higher education to the highest number of individuals.
Id e n o t eb yπs the proportion of individuals attending college under educational
23See Schoﬁeld (1995) for a discussion of the possible determinants of the impact of tracking on
college attendance from a sociological point of view.
21system s,f o rs = M,T,t h a ti sπs =1− Fs(θ
∗
1).I a l s o d e ﬁne the probability of
attending college conditional on individual background. I denote by π1,s the prob-
ability of attending college for an individual with poor parents (x =1 ) ,t h a ti s
π1,s =1− Fs(θ
∗
1 | x =1 ) , and by πx,s the probability of attending college for an
individual with rich parents, that is, πx,s =1 − Fs(θ
∗
1 | x>1). Both probabilities
depend on the minimum level of human capital required to attend college, θ
∗
1.
I compare total college attendance under both educational systems. I need ﬁrst to
analyze the value of θ1 for which both cumulative distributions functions cross each
other, since the relation between this value and θ
∗
1 is crucial to determine the system
that maximizes college attendance. I also see that the crucial parameter to determine
the value of θ1 where they cross is λ.
To see this, Propositions 4 and 5 below show that the system that maximizes
college attendance depends on the particular income level in the population.
In Section 3 we saw that FM cuts FT from below for any value of λ,α and x.T h e
next Proposition shows that the crossing point can be only in one of the two intervals
of θ1, depending on the proportion of rich individuals in the population, λ.
Proposition 3 There is a unique   θ1  =0such that FT(   θ1)=FM(   θ1).I f λ <   λ,
then   θ1 ∈ (a,b). If λ >   λ,t h e n  θ1 ∈ (c,d).
Proof. See Appendix.
Moreover I see that   θ1 is an increasing function of the proportion of rich individuals
in the economy λ, independently of the interval where   θ1 is located.24
T h u s ,w eh a v et h a ti fθ1 ∈ (0,   θ1) then FT(θ1) − FM(θ1) > 0,a n di fθ1 ∈ (  θ1,f)
then FT(θ1) − FM(θ1) < 0. In other words, the density function of θ1 under tracking
accumulates more probability in the tails than under mixing.
When there are few rich people (λ is low), FM surpasses FT for a low value of
θ1. The intuition could be that family background cannot oﬀset the peer eﬀect which
is stronger under tracking than under mixing. As the society gets richer, average
human capital increases as we showed in Section 2.3, and the crossing point   θ1 moves
to the right. In other words, the C.D.F. under mixing will be below the C.D.F. under
tracking for a larger interval of values of θ1.
24Note from Equation (18) that if   θ1 ∈ (a,b) then,   θ1 =
(1−λ)a32cb3
2(a3λ(2c−b3)+(1−λ)2cb3). If   θ1 ∈ (c,d) then,
  θ1 = λa3eb3
2(λa3e+(1−λ)b3(e−a3)).
22Now I consider how the income of the rich x aﬀects the relationship between   θ1
and θ
∗
1 since this relation, as we will see below, determines the system that maximizes
the proportion of college students.
First of all, remember from Equation (21) that the minimum level of human
capital required to attend college is increasing with the opportunity cost of college
attendance, γ. Now I deﬁne two particular values of this opportunity cost that cor-
respond to two diﬀerent compositions of the college student body under tracking. I
denote by γ the opportunity cost such δ(a)=γ.T h a ti s ,w h e nt h eo p p o r t u n i t yc o s t
is γ,w eg e tθ
∗
1 = a. This value γ is such that when γ > γ , under tracking only poor
in the high track attend college. See Figure 1. I denote by γ the opportunity cost
such that δ(d)=γ. That is, when the opportunity cost is γ,w eg e tθ
∗
1 = d. In other
words, if γ < γ all rich individuals in the high track go to college.
The next Proposition shows that when λ is above some threshold value, that is
for rich enough societies, the system that maximizes college attendance is mixing,
whereas if λ is below that threshold value, that is for poor societies, the optimal
educational system is tracking. I show also that this threshold level is increasing with
the opportunity cost of attending college.
Proposition 4 If γ ∈ (γ,γ) the education system that maximizes college attendance
changes from tracking (poor societies) to mixing (rich societies) as the income level
in the population rises. For any income level in the population the following two
statements hold:
(i) If γ ≤ γ then mixing maximizes college attendance.
(ii) If γ ≥ γ then tracking maximizes college attendance.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Figure 3 I illustrate this result. First note that for both extreme values of
θ
∗




1 >d , the proportion of rich individuals in
the population plays no role in the choice of the educational system that maximizes
the proportion of college students. If the minimum level of human capital required
to attend college is very low, the proportion of college students is maximized under
mixing. The intuition could be that, in general, individuals who cannot reach the
minimum level of human capital are those with low levels of innate ability. Under
mixing, a higher proportion of those individuals will attain the minimum required,
since the peer variable is stronger than under tracking.25
25The case of Spain during the eighties could be suitable to illustrate this result. During those
23 
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11 () () MT π θπ θ >For the same reason, if the minimum level of income required to attend college
is high, the proportion of college students is maximized under tracking. In that case
the proportion of individuals with larger levels of θ1 is higher under tracking than
under mixing.
For intermediate values of θ
∗
1 the educational system that maximizes college atten-
dance depends on the income level in the population. In particular, as the proportion
of rich individuals rises, the optimal educational system changes from tracking to
mixing. The intuition could be as follows. Take as given a minimum level of human
capital required to attend college, θ
∗
1. In poor societies we ensure that the probability
of attending college will be as high as possible under tracking. In these case the
minimum human capital required is such that the poor students attending college
under tracking belongs to the high track, and for those individuals θ1 is higher under
tracking (since the peer variable is stronger). In rich societies, in order to maximize
college attendance we have to ensure that the probability of attending college for rich
individuals is as high as possible. Under tracking, the rich individuals (for this inter-
val of θ
∗
1) belongs to the low track. But we already know that the human capital of
those individuals is higher under mixing (since the peer variable for them is stronger).
Thus, the educational system that maximizes college attendance is mixing.
In addition, the previous Proposition implies that as the minimum level of human
capital required to attend college rises, the proportion of rich required to maximize
college attendance under mixing increases as well. That is, it is needed a higher
proportion of rich individuals beneﬁting from being in mixed classrooms rather than
in low tracked classrooms.
4.1.1 Rawlsian Criteria
Throughout the paper it is implicitly assumed that individuals derive utility from
income, which they get in the labor market, either as skilled or unskilled workers.
Individuals maximize utility when deciding whether to attend college or not.
Suppose now that the government wants to maximize the utility of the worst-oﬀ
individuals in the society. To do this we have to deﬁne ﬁr s tw h oa r et h ew o r s t - o ﬀ.I f ,
years, and given the low rates of college attendance prevailing, the priority of the government was
to maximize the proportion of college students. The low opportunity cost of college attendance at
that moment, together with a mixing education system at compulsory level yielded an extraordinary
increase in the number of college students (from 744,115 in 1983/84 to 1,508,842 in 1995/96. See
Estadística Universitaria (2003)).
25for example, we take as the worst-oﬀ those with innate ability below the median level
and with poor parents, the result is quite trivial. Mixing is always better. This comes
directly from the properties of the human capital production function (Equations (1)
and (2)), since maximizing the utility of these individuals will imply to maximize their
human capital at compulsory level θ1, which in turn will increase their probability of
college attendance.26
Therefore, I propose to widen the concept of worse-oﬀ individuals by considering
as the worst-oﬀ all individuals with poor parents. Thus, I assume that the government
chooses the educational system that maximizes the utility of this group by maximizing
their probability of attending college. I deﬁne two particular value of the opportunity
cost of college attendance. I denote by γ0 the opportunity cost such that δ(a /2) = γ0.
That is, if the opportunity cost is γ0 ,w eg e tt h a tθ
∗
1 = a /2 which is exactly the
level of human capital acquired under mixing by poor individuals with median innate
ability (θ0 =1 /2). I denote by γ1 the opportunity cost such that δ(e)=γ1 .T h a ti s ,
if the opportunity cost is γ1 ,w eg e tt h a tθ
∗
1 = e. In other words, γ1 is the minimum
opportunity cost required to ensure that independently of the education system only
rich individuals will attend college
In the next Proposition I show that when the minimum level of human capital
required to attend college is low, mixing maximizes college attendance and the reverse
occurs for high levels of θ
∗
1.
Proposition 5 Let γ < γ1 .T h e ni fγ < (>) γ0 then mixing (tracking) maximizes
college attendance of the worst-oﬀ.
Proof. See Appendix.
I illustrate this result in Figure 4. From the human capital production function
we have that, for those individuals with innate ability below the median level, their
ﬁnal level of human capital is higher under mixing than under tracking. In particular,
under mixing is equal to (1/2)a . Under tracking some of them will be placed in the
high track and their ﬁnal human capital will be b. However, some of those individuals
will be placed in the low track, and their ﬁnal human capital will be a.
Then, when the minimum level of human capital required to attend college θ
∗
1 is
below (1/2)a , the proportion of individuals above θ
∗
1 is higher under tracking than
26Note that this applies to all the individuals with θ0 <m , except for that individual with θ0 =0 .
It applies to all the individuals for any other uniform distribution with lower bound strictly positive.
26 
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Figure 4. RAWLSIAN CRITERIA under mixing. The reverse occurs when θ
∗
1 ∈ ((1/2)a ,e) and college attendance
of the worst-oﬀ is maximized with tracking. Finally, when θ
∗
1 >e , the probability
of attending college is zero for the poor, independently of the educational system
prevailing.
In the following table I summarize the main results in Propositions 4 and 5:
Table1.Maximize College Attendance
λ \ γ γ < γ γ < γ < γ γ < γ





















Note: Total=Total College Attendance;Poors=Poors College Attendance;M=Mixing;T=Tracking
Observe that for poor societies tracking maximizes college attendance both for
the poor and total population, when the opportunity cost of attending college is
high enough. For rich societies, and provided that the opportunity cost of attending
college is low enough, mixing maximizes college attendance both for the poor and
total population.
In the following section I use a diﬀerent criteria to compare both systems: equality
of opportunities. In particular I analyze which system minimizes the income gap by
trying to bring into line the probability of college attendance between individuals
with poor and rich parents.
4.2 Equality of Opportunities
In this section I study which system better guarantees that individuals’ decision of
whether or not to attend college or not, is taken independently of parents’ income.
For both systems I deﬁne the income premium ps(θ
∗
1) or income gap, as the dif-
ference in the probability of attending college between the rich and the poor under
education system s,f o rs = M,T:
ps(θ
∗
1)=πx,s − π1,s. (22)
If the government wants to guarantee equality of opportunities, it should choose
the system s that makes ps(θ
∗
1)=0 . Since this is not possible because ps(θ
∗
1) is always
strictly positive, an educational system is called “equitable” if it minimizes the income
premium ps(θ
∗
1). As we will see below, which system is the most equitable depends
on the minimum level of human capital required to attend college.
28Observe also that the income premium is deﬁned only for strictly positive values
of both πx,s and π1,s, that is, when the minimum level of human capital required
to attend college for both systems is such that there are individuals with poor and
rich parents attending college. This is equivalent to say that the income premium is
deﬁned for every θ
∗
1 ≤ a .
Since we are comparing the probability of attending college between individuals
with diﬀerent family backgrounds, the result will be driven by the level of income
inequality in the population. Remember from Section 2 that the variance of income
is (x − 1)2λ(1 − λ),t h u si ti si n c r e a s i n gw i t hx. Therefore, if we take the proportion
of rich individuals λ as given, income inequality will be characterized by x.
In the following proposition I state which system is more equitable. I ﬁnd that this
depends both on the minimum level of human capital required to attend college and on
the level of income inequality in the population. In particular, income inequality plays
a crucial role when the minimum level of human capital required to attend college is
low. If this is not the case, tracking is the most equitable system independently of
the level of income inequality in the population.
Proposition 6 Deﬁne   x(α)=2
3(
α
1−α). There is a minimum level of human capital
required to attend college η1 ∈ (a,b) such that:
(i) When θ
∗
1 ≤ η1 the following two statements hold:
(i.1) If x ≤   x(α) tracking is the most equitable system.
(i.2) If x ≥   x(α) mixing is the most equitable system.
(ii) When θ
∗
1 > η1 tracking is the most equitable system independently of the level
of income inequality.
Proof. See Appendix.
I illustrate this result in Figure 5. First of all note that when θ
∗
1 ≤ η1 every
individual placed in the high track will attend college, and thus both individuals
from rich and poor families share the same probability of attending college, which
is 1/2. This implies that the income premium under tracking is capturing just the
income gap for those individuals placed in the low track.
The proposition above shows that when income inequality is low, tracking is the
most equitable system, independently of the level of human capital required to attend
college. If this is not the case and income inequality is high, as θ
∗
1 rises, tracking
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Figure 5. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES In addition, the previous proposition shows that when the minimum level of human
capital required to attend college is high enough (above b), then tracking is the most
equitable system. The intuition could be that when θ
∗
1 > η1 there are no poor
individuals from the low track attending college. Since the positive eﬀect of the peer
variable is higher for the most skilled individuals under tracking and, in particular,
for those students placed in the high track, their family background is not a crucial
factor to determine their ﬁnal level of human capital. However, under mixing, and
for those individuals with the same level of innate ability, it is the case that their
b a c k g r o u n d sh a v eah i g h e rr e l a t i v ew e i g ht, and as a result the income premium is
crucially aﬀected by this variable.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper I have analyzed public intervention in education when the government,
taking into account the process of human capital production and in particular the
peer eﬀect on students’ achievement, has to decide how to group students. I analyze
two diﬀerent educational systems. The ﬁrst one, tracking, consists on grouping stu-
dents according to their innate ability. The second one, mixing, groups students into
c o m p l e t e l yh o m o g e n e o u sg r o u p s . T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h i sp a p e rw a st oe v a l u a t eb o t h
educational systems using several criteria. These criteria are classiﬁed depending on
the educational level analyzed, compulsory or college education.
Some previous works studied the optimal education system at compulsory level by
focusing on mean achievement. In particular, Arnott and Rowse (1987) studied the
optimal allocation of students and educational expenditures over classrooms when
peer eﬀects are present. They concluded that the optimal allocation, when the ob-
jective is to maximize the sum of students results, depends on the properties of the
educational production function. My paper contributes to this line of research in two
directions.
The ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to introduce the Veil of Ignorance approach
in the evaluation of both systems at compulsory level. We saw that under quite
reasonable assumptions based on the existing empirical evidence regarding human
capital production factors, if we are only interested in maximizing average human
capital, the optimal educational system is tracking. However it was also checked that
there is no system that dominates the other in the ﬁrst or second order stochastic
sense.
31The second contribution of the paper is to highlight the importance of peer eﬀects
on college choices. Regarding college attendance it is shown that the system that
provides maximum college attendance depends on the opportunity cost of attending
college and on the income level in the society. In particular, when the opportunity
cost is low, mixing maximizes college attendance. When the opportunity cost is high,
tracking maximizes college attendance. With respect to equality of opportunities I
found the surprising result that tracking minimizes the income premium in most cases
except in situations where there is a high level of inequality in the society, and the
level of human capital required to attend college is low. As far as I know there is no
previous literature on peer eﬀects on college attendance decisions.
I believe these results are relevant for several issues in the Economics of Education
literature. Studies that link persistent levels of inequality in the population to neigh-
borhood eﬀects is an interesting example. Empirical investigation of college choices
and the impact of diﬀerent ﬁnancial schemes on college attendance decisions could
also beneﬁt from our analysis.
In this paper I assumed that the achievement of individual students rises with
an improvement in the average quality of their classroom, but at a decreasing rate.
Another important issue regarding the non-linearities of peer group eﬀects is the
importance of “distance”. There is empirical evidence that suggests that peers’ eﬀects
are stronger when the distance between the individual’s innate ability and the average
innate ability in the classroom is small, and that as this distance increases, peers’
eﬀects become almost negligible. Although I did not model such eﬀect it can be
checked that it will only reinforce my main results without adding additional insights.
For example, regarding Proposition 1 observe that under tracking, students in the
high track gain more because the peer eﬀect is stronger and also because the distance
to the average ability in the group is lower. Individuals in the low track ﬁrst lose
because of a lower average ability in the group, but now there is a new positive eﬀect
under tracking, since the distance to the average ability in the group is also lower. 27
The paper allows for some extensions. On the one hand it could be interesting
to check the robustness of the main results of the paper to particular features of the
model. It could be important to relax some assumptions of the model, in particular
27See for example Manski and Wise (1983) where they conclude that students “preferred to enroll
in colleges where the average academic ability of the enrolled students was slightly higher than their
own. Schools where the average SAT scores of entering freshmen were either too low or too high
were relatively disfavored.”
32some properties of the human capital production function. For example, I could
introduce diﬀerent measures of the so called “peer eﬀect”, like some measure of the
level of heterogeneity in the group. Moreover, it could be interesting to consider
other distributions of innate ability. Other possible ways of modelling the tracking
system could be considered. For example, introducing the possibility that students
are placed in tracked classes for only a subset of subjects as in Epple, Newlon and
Romano (2002). In addition to adding realism, incorporating this possibility would
be helpful for determining the design of an optimal educational system. On the other
hand it could be also interesting to compare both education systems in a dynamic
set up.
336 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) FT(θ1) SOSD FM(θ1). Using FT(θ1) from (18) and
FM(θ1) from (6) we can check that,
b  
0
(FT(θ1)−FM(θ1))dθ1 > 0, for every λ,α and x.
(ii) FM(θ1) SOSD FT(θ1). Recall that the expected value of a random variable deﬁned
on [0,z] can be written as: E[z]=z −
z  
0
F(z)dz. But then, if FM(θ1)  SOSD FT(θ1)
then the following inequality should hold: f −EM(θ1) ≤ f −ET(θ1). The ﬁnal result
is immediate from Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :Id e n o t eb y  λ the proportion of rich individuals in the
economy such that
  λ
1−  λ = Λ,w h e r eΛ is deﬁned as Λ =
2cb (e − a )
(b  − 2c)a e
. In Section 3 it
was shown that FT(θ1)−FM(θ1) > 0 for all θ1 ∈ (0,a),w h e r e a sFT(θ1)−FM(θ1) < 0
for all θ1 ∈ (d,f). It is easy to verify also that FT(b) − FM(b) < (>)0 if and only if
FT(c)−FM(c) < (>)0. If we evaluate the two C.D.F., under mixing and tracking for










.T h u s ,
from Equation (18) FT(c) >F M(c) if and only if
λ
1 − λ
> Λ. The ﬁnal result follows
immediately from the deﬁnition of   λ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :From Proposition 4 and the fact that FM always cut FT
from below, a necessary and suﬃcient condition to ensure that πM(θ
∗
1) > (<) πT(θ
∗
1)
is that   θ1 > (<) θ
∗
1 .I fγ < γ then, from Proposition 4 we have that   θ1 > θ
∗
1 for all
λ. Now assume γ ∈ (γ,γ). If γ is such that θ
∗
1 ∈ (b,c) then, from Proposition 4 we
have that if λ <   λ then,   θ1 < θ
∗
1 and if λ >   λ then,   θ1 > θ
∗
1. Now let γ be such that
θ
∗
1 ∈ (a,b) or θ
∗
1 ∈ (c,d). Then, for each θ
∗
1 there is one λ, denoted by   λ, such that
  θ1(  λ)=θ
∗
1. Thus, since   θ1 is increasing with λ we have that, if λ <   λ then   θ1 < θ
∗
1
and if λ >   λ then,   θ1 > θ
∗
1. From Proposition 4 we have that   λ <   λ. Finally, if γ > γ
then, from Proposition 4 we have that   θ1 < θ
∗
1 for all λ.




From Assumptions 1 and 2   x(α) ∈ [x(α),x(α)]. From Equations (6) and (22) we have
that the income premium under mixing when θ
∗










Take ﬁrst any θ
∗
1 ∈ (0,a) and the resulting income premium under tracking from









.B y A . 2 w e h a v e t h a t a<a  .T h u s ,
34just comparing both income premium and from Equations (4), (5) for pM(θ
∗
1) and
Equations (9) and (10) for pT(θ
∗
1) we can check that pT(θ
∗
1) ≥ (≤) pM(θ
∗
1) if and only
if x ≥ (≤)   x(α).N o wt a k ea n yθ
∗











. Let η1 = a b c
2c(b −a )+a b  be a level of human capital
strictly lower than b. Then, if we compare again the income premium under tracking




1) is x ≤
  x(α). If x>  x(α) then, just by comparing both income premiums it can be checked
that pT(θ
∗
1) ≥ (≤) pM(θ
∗
1) if and only if θ
∗
1 ≤ (≥) η1. Take any θ
∗
1 that belongs to









. As b<a   we ﬁnd









. From Equations (4)
and (5) for pM(θ
∗



























This inequality holds for every x and α.N o w t a k e a n y θ
∗
1 that belongs to (c,d).









.F r o m A . 2 w e h a v e




1) implies that the following inequality must
hold: θ
∗
1 < a b b
a b −2b(b −a ). As u ﬃcient condition to ensure it is a b b
a b −2b(b −a ) ≤ d. The last
inequality is equivalent to: b −a 
a b  ≥ d−b
2bd. From Equations (4) and (5) for pM(θ
∗
1) and
Equations (11) and (13) for pT(θ
∗
1) we check that the last inequality holds if and only
if x ≥ (2α(4/3)α)
1
1−α. But this is always true since x(α) > (2α(4/3)α)
1
1−α. Now, if θ
∗
1










we have just seen that b −a 
a b  ≥ d−b




1) in this interval.
Proof of Proposition 7: In a previous section we have shown that, under both
educational systems θ1 is uniformly distributed on the diﬀerent intervals determined
by each income and ability group. Thus under mixing, if θ
∗






1 ∈ (a ,b  ) then π1,M =0 . These probabilities under tracking are as follows.
If θ
∗
1 ∈ (0,a) then π1,T =
2a−θ∗
1
2a ,f o ra n yθ
∗
1 ∈ (a,b) we have that π1,T = 1
2. Following
t h es a m er e a s o n i n g ,i fθ
∗





(e−b) . The proof follows just by
comparing π1,M and π1,T for the diﬀerent intervals.
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